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International Coffee Agreements and the Elusive
Goal of Price Stability
Matthew J. Foli
The world coffee market traditionally suffers severe price
fluctuations. Coffee' is second only to petroleum in primary
commodity sales,2 and provides employment for over twenty mil-
lion people. 3 Coffee is almost exclusively produced and exported
by developing countries that depend heavily on coffee trade for
foreign exchange earnings.4 In fact, importing nations consume
approximately three-fourths of global production. 5
1. Coffee beans consist of the cherry-like fruit of the coffee tree. Richard
B. Bilder, The International Coffee Agreement: A Case History in Negotiation, 28
LAw & CONTEMp. PROBS. 328, 331 (1963). Coffee is grown commercially only in
tropical regions. Id. The two major types of coffee beans are Arabica and
Robusta. J. DE GRAAFF, THE ECONOMICS OF COFFEE 58 (1986). Arabica beans
are divided into washed and unwashed Arabicas. Id. at 61. The washed Arabi-
cas are further divided into "Colombian Milds," grown in Colombia, and "Other
Milds," grown in Central America. Id. at 62. Unwashed Arabicas, grown
mainly in Brazil, id., are also known as "Brazilian Arabicas." Robusta beans,
usually unwashed, are grown in Africa. Id. at 61. These four varieties are
partly substitutes for each other and partly complementary. Id.
2. BART S. FISHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT: A STUDY IN
COFFEE DIPLOMACY 3 (1972). A primary commodity is defined as: "any product
of farm, forest or fishery or any mineral, in its natural form or which has under-
gone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in
substantial volume in international trade." CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ORGANIZATION, March 24, 1948, art. 56(1), U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78, re-
printed in U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948), and in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No.
3206, COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES 113 (1948). This document is commonly
known as the Havana Charter.
3. JAMES MWANDHA ET AL., COFFEE: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY
AGREEMENTS xii (1985).
4. In 1985, Colombia's coffee exports accounted for 51% of its reported ex-
change earnings. DONNA U. VOGT, INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT: A STA-
TUS REPORT 3 (Congressional Research Service, No. 90-159, 1990). Also in
1985, the Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras and Nicaragua earned 25% to 63% of total export revenues from cof-
fee. Id.; see also DE GRAAFF, supra note 1, at 58; MwANDHA, supra note 3, at xii.
5. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., No. 2-94, TROPICAL PROD-
UCTS: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE 3 (1994) [hereinafter TROPICAL PRODUCTS].
For the 1994-1995 season, world coffee consumption is estimated at 99 million
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Beginning in the early 1960s, coffee producing and consum-
ing countries agreed upon the use of export quotas in the pursuit
of reasonable market prices and stable supplies. International
Coffee Agreements were signed in 1962,6 1968, 7 19768 and
1983. 9 While each agreement had a specific duration ° and im-
proved upon previous agreements, none succeeded in stabilizing
coffee market prices over an extended time period.
In 1989, coffee producing and consuming countries failed to
renew the export quotas. Market prices dropped significantly,
and, in 1992, reached the lowest level in twenty years. In re-
sponse, coffee producing countries advocated the enactment of a
new agreement and a return to export quotas. Coffee importers,
however, advocated a free and unrestricted trade in coffee."' In
September 1993, twenty-eight coffee producing nations from
Asia, Africa and Latin America formed the Association of Coffee
Producing Countries.1 2 The producer group established the Cof-
fee Retention Plan to promote a stable balance of market supply
bags; 74 million bags in importing nations, and 25 million bags in producing
countries. Id. One bag of coffee equals 60 kilograms or 132.276 pounds of green
coffee. International Coffee Agreement 1962, opened for signature Sept. 28,
1962, art. 2(2), 14 U.S.T. 1911, 1914, 469 U.N.T.S. 169, 174 [hereinafter ICA
1962].
6. ICA 1962, supra note 5.
7. International Coffee Agreement 1968, opened for signature Mar. 18,
1968, 19 U.S.T. 6333, 647 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICA 1968].
8. International Coffee Agreement 1976, opened for signature Jan. 31,
1976, 28 U.S.T. 6401, 1024 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICA 1976].
9. International Coffee Agreement 1983, opened for signature Jan. 1,
1983, T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, 1333 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter ICA 1983].
10. The first two agreements were for five years. ICA 1962, supra note 5,
art. 71(1), 14 U.S.T. at 1945, 469 U.N.T.S. at 240; ICA 1968, supra note 7, art.
69(1), 19 U.S.T. at 6390, 647 U.N.T.S. at 84. The last two agreements were for
six years. ICA 1976, supra note 8, art. 68(1), 28 U.S.T. at 6463, 1024 U.N.T.S.
at 35; ICA 1983, supra note 9, art. 68(1), T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, at 71, 1333
U.N.T.S. at 149.
11. NATIONAL COFFEE ASS'N OF U.S.A., NCA SPECIAL BULLETIN, No. 259
(1992). The National Coffee Association (NCA) advised the U.S. government
that "[tihe interests of the United States Coffee Consumer and industry are
best accommodated by free and unrestricted trade in coffee." Id. The NCA is an
industry trade association representing 85% of U.S. coffee trading and roasting
activities. RICHARD L. LUCIER, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
COFFEE: FROM JUAN VALDEZ TO YANies DINER 125 (1988).
12. Association members produce "nearly ninety percent" of the world's cof-
fee supply. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., No. 2-93, WORLD COF-
FEE SITUATION 18 (1993) [hereinafter WORLD COFFEE SrrUATION]. Signatories
included Angola, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Nicaragua
Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Venezuela and Zaire. Id.
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and demand. 13 The producer group attempted to raise coffee
market prices by requiring members to withhold certain per-
centages of all coffee ready for exportation. 14 Market followers
predicted that any rise in the market price would inevitably lead
to cheating by certain members. 15 Instead, market prices rose
quickly and consuming countries' stocks were reduced. From
October 1993 to May 1994, prices rose from less than seventy
cents per pound to over one dollar per pound.
This Note examines this attempt by producers to bring long-
term price stability to the world coffee market. Part I identifies
the forces creating severe price instability in the coffee market.
Part II describes the development of past International Coffee
Agreements and their fundamental components. Part III details
the provisions of the 1993 Coffee Retention Plan. Part IV evalu-
ates the 1993 Coffee Retention Plan vis-A-vis previous agree-
ments. This Note concludes that while the 1993 Coffee
Retention Plan remedies serious weaknesses in previous agree-
ments, it is questionable whether price stability will be achieved
in the long run.
I. FORCES UNDERLYING THE INSTABILITY OF
COFFEE MARKET PRICES
An examination of the supply and demand structure of the
coffee market reveals why prices fluctuate so severely. In the
short run, coffee price fluctuations result from the interaction
between price inelastic supply and price inelastic demand in the
coffee market. Coffee production and coffee consumption thus do
not change significantly with most changes in price. 16
In the short run, coffee supply is price inelastic. 17 As is true
for agricultural products in general, the short-run supply of cof-
fee cannot react even to severe price fluctuations. In response to
a price decrease, coffee growers often will not reduce production
13. 1993 Coffee Retention Plan, art. 2 [hereinafter 1993 PLAN] (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
14. 1993 PLAN, supra note 13, art. 8.
15. See Neil Behrmann, Some Analysts Say New Coffee Producer Cartel
Formed in Brazil is Doomed to Ultimate Failure, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1993, at
C12 (noting one analyst's feeling that "[clonsuming nations aren't taking the
pact seriously because they believe that it will fall apart"); James Brooke, A
New Coffee Cartel Tries Its Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, § 3, at 11 (noting
another analyst's feeling that "[w]ithout consumer involvement, this is an hon-
esty plan").
16. Bilder, supra note 1, at 333.
17. Id. at 331. In other words, coffee production does not readily expand or
contract over short periods even when prices vary dramatically. Id.
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because of the fixed and variable cost structure in the coffee in-
dustry.18 Fixed costs in the coffee industry are a relatively large
portion of overall costs, 19 and include the costs of clearing land
and planting coffee trees.20 By contrast, the variable costs asso-
ciated with harvesting are a relatively small portion of overall
costs.2 ' As long as growers are able to cover their marginal vari-
able costs through coffee sales, they lack an incentive to reduce
production. Even if prices drop dramatically relative to the
overall average cost, growers will not reduce coffee production. 22
In response to a short-run price increase, coffee growers cannot
increase production because of the biological time lag associated
with coffee production.23 Coffee trees require three to five years
of growth before the beans are ready for harvest.24 Despite this
lag in production, coffee growers have traditionally improved
production methods and increased planting during extended pe-
18. Growers experience very low "out of pocket" production costs. PAUL
STREETEN & DIANE ELSON, DIVERSIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF
COFFEE 16 (1971).
19. THOMAS GEER, AN OLIGOPOLY: THE WORLD COFFEE ECONOMY AND STA-
BILIZATION SCHEMES 35 (1971).
20. STREETEN & ELSON, supra note 18, at 16.
21. Id. A grower's variable costs are often further decreased through the
economic aid of state marketing authorities. MWANDHA, supra note 3, at 24.
Some marketing authorities deliberately cushion growers against price fluctua-
tions by keeping the price paid to growers more or less constant. Id. Funds
accumulated during periods of high prices may be used to subsidize growers'
prices in leaner years. Id. Marketing authorities establish production and ex-
port subsidies, preferential tax treatments for coffee producers and export du-
ties. Id. at 26. Production subsidies help growers improve coffee quality, and
also fund research and development. Id. at 24. In contrast, export duties on
coffee have particularly helped Latin American governments, sometimes pro-
viding as much as 50% of total fiscal revenue. Id. at 29. For further informa-
tion on production, see M.TH.A. PIETERSE & H.J. SILVIS, THE WORLD COFFEE
MARKET AND THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT 14-15 (1988); DE GRAAFF,
supra note 1, at 54-55.
22. Bilder, supra note 1, at 331. "The principal costs of cultivation to the
grower arise from the cost of purchasing and clearing land and planting trees,
rather than in harvesting, and a crop will generally be harvested regardless of
market price." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. A coffee tree will bear productively for 25 to 45 years. Id. Robusta
trees yield crops after three years, and Arabica trees yield crops after five years.
MWANDHA, supra note 3, at 6. Moreover, a heavy yield depletes the growing
power of a coffee tree, so that even when favorable weather follows the next
year, production decreases. FISHER, supra note 2, at 5.
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riods of high prices.25 Producers, however, can only increase the
immediate market supply by tapping into accumulated stocks.26
Coffee demand is also price inelastic in the short and long
run.27 A rise or fall in the market price has minimal effects on
consumption habits. One commentator believes that taste pref-
erences cause consumers to ignore moderate price fluctua-
tions.28 Taste preferences may also be a reason why, in the face
of rising prices, some consumers do not switch to substitute
products such as tea or soft drinks. Obviously, however, there is
a price level above which consumers will reduce their
consumption.29
25. For example, on July 17, 1975, a frost destroyed or severely damaged
1.5 billion of the 2.9 billion coffee trees in Brazil, and world market prices rose
dramatically. Rising Coffee Prices and the Federal Response: Joint Hearings
Before Certain Subcomms. of the House of Representatives Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations and the Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 135-39
(1977) [hereinafter Rising Coffee Prices] (statement of Julius L. Katz, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State).
Brazil responded by undertaking a $1 billion replanting program to restore its
coffee production. Id. Although only Brazil's coffee trees were damaged by the
frost, other countries also increased production. Id. Colombia spent $70 mil-
lion to plant 200,000 hectares of new coffee. Id. Many other countries adopted
policies to increase the use of fertilizers and pesticides. Id.
Once enough young coffee trees begin bearing fruit, market supply in-
creases, and market prices fall. STREETEN & ELSON, supra note 18, at 15-16.
This discourages new planting, but trees planted in the last three to five years
begin bearing fruit, and market supply continues to grow. Id. Such continued
growth in world supply only exacerbates the rate of decline in prices. Id.
26. MWANDHA, supra note 3, at 22.
27. The world short-term price elasticity of demand has been estimated at
-0.19. VOGT, supra note 4, at 4 n.7 (citing INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
PRIMARY COMMODITIES: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK 53-54 (1988)).
Thus a 10% increase in price leads to a 2% decrease in consumption.
MWANDHA, supra note 3, at 30.
28. RANDAL G. STEWART, COFFEE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AN EXPORT
INDUSTRY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 238-40 (1992). Historically, taste preferences
created rigid patterns of trade and solidified certain trade relationships to the
advantage of large coffee producing and consuming countries. Id.
29. The 1975 frost in Brazil caused coffee prices to soar, and officials in
New York City and Chicago asked consumers to reduce their consumption be-
tween 20% and 50%. Rising Coffee Prices, supra note 25, at 37-42 (statement of
Elinor Guggenheimer, Commissioner, Consumer Affairs for New York City;
statement of Jane Byrne, Commissioner, Consumer Affairs for Chicago). In late
1976, a New York City poll showed that 52% of those surveyed had either quit
drinking coffee, or were drinking less than usual. Id. at 39. The New York City
"cut-coffee-consumption" campaign received letters of support from 3000 U.S.
and Canadian consumers. Id.
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Over the past thirty years long-term demand for coffee has
decreased. 30 Over the same period, major producing countries
have reduced their economic reliance on coffee for export in-
come. 31 Over the long run, price stability will be achieved only if
* producing countries keep growth to a reasonable level during
supply shortages, thereby avoiding the predictable market over-
supply that occurs a few years later. Historically, however, indi-
vidual countries have not been willing to limit production and
forego anticipated profits during the period just preceding the
predicted period of oversupply.32 Throughout this century, the
oversupply of coffee relative to consumer demand remains the
primary cause of declining market prices.33
II. EVOLUTION OF PAST INTERNATIONAL
COFFEE AGREEMENTS
The stabilization of both coffee export revenues and import
payments was the driving force3 4 behind each of the four Inter-
national Coffee Agreements signed from 1962 to 1983. To ac-
complish this goal, the agreements attempted "to avoid
excessive fluctuations in the levels of world supplies, stocks and
prices which are harmful to both producers and consumers."
35
Each agreement primarily used export regulations in an at-
30. WORLD COFFEE SITUATION, supra note 12, at 14. In 1962, U.S. per cap-
ita coffee consumption peaked at 3.12 cups per day. Id. In 1993, U.S. per capita
coffee consumption was at 1.87 cups per day. Id. This translates to U.S. per
capita coffee consumption of almost 16 pounds of coffee in 1960 and 10 pounds
of coffee in 1993. TROPICAL PRODUCTS, supra note 5, at 18. The long-term price
elasticity of demand has been estimated at -0.23. VOGT, supra note 4, at 4 n.7
(citing INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, PRIMARY COMMODITIES: MARKET DE-
VELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK 53-54 (1988)).
31. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 265; WERNER BAER, THE BRAzIiAN ECON-
oMy: GRowTH AND DEVELOPMENT 369 (1989). The agricultural portion of Bra-
zil's economic output decreased from 16% in 1959 to less than 10% in 1975. See
BAER, supra, at 369.
32. MWANDHA, supra note 3, at 23.
33. FISHER, supra note 2, at 1-12. Brazil's overproduction accounts for
most of the world's oversupply during this century. Id. at 7.
34. PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra note 21, at 47.
35. ICA 1983, supra note 9, art. 1(2), T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, at 5, 1333
U.N.T.S. at 122; see also ICA 1962, supra note 5, art. 1(2), 14 U.S.T. at 1913,
469 U.N.T.S. at 172; ICA 1968, supra note 7, art. 1(2), 19 U.S.T. at 6336, 647
U.N.T.S. at 6; ICA 1976, supra note 8, art. 1(2), 28 U.S.T. at 6404, 1024
U.N.T.S. at 5. The objectives of the agreements were:
1. To achieve a reasonable balance between world supply and demand
on a basis which will assure adequate supplies of coffee at fair prices
to consumers and markets for coffee at remunerative prices to pro-
ducers and which will be conducive to long-term equilibrium be-
tween production and consumption;
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tempt to stabilize production and prices. 36 Despite the fact that
long-term equilibrium between production and consumption re-
mained a constant objective, 37 each agreement was actually cre-
ated to respond to short-term market crises. No agreement has
succeeded in stabilizing prices for an extended period. In fact, a
new agreement has been enacted almost every six years to ad-
dress a new market crisis.
A. THE 1962 AGREEMENT
In the first half of this century, coffee market prices fluctu-
ated severely.38 The U.S. government, however, was against
any long-term commodity agreement between consuming and
producing nations.39 Even as late as the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration, participation in a long-term international coffee agree-
ment was viewed, in the words of one commentator, "as a sin
against free enterprise."40 The Kennedy Administration, how-
2. To avoid excessive fluctuations in the levels of world supplies, stocks
and prices which are harmful to both producers and consumers;
3. To contribute to the development of productive resources and to the
promotion and maintenance of employment and income in Member
countries, thereby helping to bring about fair wages, higher living
standards and better working conditions;
4. To increase the purchasing power of coffee-exporting countries by
keeping prices in accordance with provisions of paragraph (1) of this
Article and by increasing consumption;
5. To promote and increase the consumption of coffee by every possible
means;
6. In general, in recognition of the relationship of the trade in coffee to
the economic stability of markets for industrial products, to further
international cooperation in connection with world coffee problems.
ICA 1983, supra note 9, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, at 5, 1333 U.N.T.S. at 121-
22; see also ICA 1962, supra note 5, art. 1, 14 U.S.T. at 1913-14, 469 U.N.T.S. at
172; ICA 1968, supra note 7, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6335-36, 647 U.N.T.S. at 6; ICA
1976, supra note 8, art. 1, 28 U.S.T. at 6404, 1024 U.N.T.S. at 5.
36. PIETERSE & SILvIS, supra note 21, at 47.
37. ICA 1962, supra note 5, art. 1(1), 14 U.S.T. at 1913, 469 U.N.T.S. at
172; ICA 1968, supra note 7, art. 1(1), 19 U.S.T. at 6335, 647 U.N.T.S. at 6; ICA
1976, supra note 8, art. 1(1), 28 U.S.T. at 6404, 1024 U.N.T.S. at 5; ICA 1983,
supra note 9, art. 1(1), T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, at 5, 1333 U.N.T.S. at 121; see also
PIETERSE & SILvIs, supra note 21, at 46.
38. See LUCIER, supra note 11, at 118. The Great Depression led to a sub-
stantial reduction in world coffee demand. Id. Prices fell from $.25 per pound
in 1925 to $.08 per pound in 1931. Id. World demand recovered after World
War II, and surplus producer stocks diminished. Id. at 119. The rise in market
prices induced Brazil and other producers to increase planting. Id. However, in
1953, a severe frost in Brazil and the outbreak of the Korean War caused prices
to rise significantly. PIETERSE & SILvIS, supra note 21, at 59.
39. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 21-23.
40. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN
THE WHITE HOUSE 190 (1965).
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ever, began to take an active roll in forming an international
coffee agreement.4 ' The administration feared that economic
failure in Latin America would lead to the spread of commu-
nism.4 2 U.S. coffee importers also supported this change in pol-
icy out of economic self-interest. They feared that economic
disruption would lead to difficulties in obtaining coffee sup-
plies.4 3 Support from the domestic industry most concerned
with coffee market stability greatly eased congressional passage
of the 1962 Agreement.44
The 1962 Agreement established the International Coffee
Organization ("ICO") to administer the provisions of the agree-
ment and to supervise its operation.45 The 1962 Agreement es-
tablished export quotas to assure that coffee prices would not
decline below the general level of 1962 prices.4 6 Each producing
country's quota was based upon its historical share of world ex-
ports rather than projected production.4 7 Countries that were
already large coffee producers were thus assured of maintaining
their world export shares. At the same time, historically smaller
exporters wishing to increase their coffee exports were pre-
vented from doing so. However, the agreement did not regulate
41. FISHER, supra note 2, at 27-29. In June 1958, the United States formed
a Coffee Study Group, composed of all the major coffee producing and coffee
consuming countries. Id. at 22. On December 4, 1961, this Group produced a
draft document that became the basis for the 1962 Agreement. LUCIER, supra
note 11, at 123.
42. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 27; LUCIER, supra note 11, at 124. On
March 13, 1961, President Kennedy presented his "Alliance for Progress"
speech. FISHER, supra note 2, at 28. Kennedy proposed U.S. readiness to "coop-
erate in serious case-by-case examinations of commodity market problems"
with Latin American countries. Id.
43. LUCIER, supra note 11, at 124-27. The NCA expressed the collective
viewpoint of the U.S. coffee industry. Id. In 1960, the United States accounted
for more than 50% of world coffee imports. Id. at 121.
44. Id. at 133.
45. ICA 1962, supra note 5, art. 7(1), 14 U.S.T. at 1918, 469 U.N.T.S. at
180.
46. Id. art. 27(2), 14 U.S.T. at 1926, 469 U.N.T.S. at 198. Export quotas
support prices by limiting the exports of each member. Bilder, supra note 1, at
329 n.2.
47. See ICA 1962, supra note 5, art. 28(1), Annex A, 14 U.S.T. at 1926, 469
U.N.T.S. at 198; STEwART, supra note 28, at 248. Brazil and Colombia received
inflated quotas, while African countries received much smaller quotas. See ICA
1962, supra note 5, Annex A, 14 U.S.T. at 1926, 469 U.N.T.S. at 198. The "basic
export quotas" were totalled and adjusted up or down after being compared to
worldwide consumption estimates. Id. art. 28(2), 14 U.S.T. at 1926, 469
U.N.T.S. at 200. Historically based export quotas allowed the reinforcement of
established trade patterns and ensured that any changes evolved slowly over
time. See STEwART, supra note 28, at 248.
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exports to all consumer markets. Despite objections from the
United States and the large Latin American producers, the
agreement exempted shipments to countries having a low per
capita consumption and considerable potential for expansion.48
The intention was to increase coffee consumption in these coun-
tries by selling at prices lower than in the agreement's regulated
markets. 49 The exemption effectively created a two-tier pricing
system.
Votes within the ICO were also allocated according to his-
torical world market shares. Although the agreement equally
distributed votes between producing and consuming nations,50
countries with the largest export quotas and import volumes re-
ceived most of the votes.51
Both exporting and importing countries soon discovered
ways to undermine the agreement's objectives.5 2 Under the
agreement, customs agents were required to monitor all coffee
imports for "Certificates of Origin."53 It was not until October 1,
1964, however, that the ICO ruled that importing countries
could not admit coffee exports from members without such docu-
mentation. 54 Even after enforcing Certificate of Origin require-
ments, countries found additional ways to circumvent the terms
of the agreement. Some exporting countries used invalid Certifi-
cates, asserting that nowhere in the agreement was it stated
that the Certificates had to be valid.55 More importantly, ex-
porters shipped large quantities of coffee to countries with low
per capita consumption levels, where it was then redirected to
the United States and other traditional consuming countries. 56
48. ICA 1962, supra note 5, art. 40, Annex B, 14 U.S.T. at 1930-31, 469
U.N.T.S. at 208.
49. PIETERSE & SiLvis, supra note 21, at 64.
50. The exporting and importing members each held a total of 1000 votes.
ICA 1962, supra note 5, art. 12(1), 14 U.S.T. at 1919, 469 U.N.T.S. at 184.
51. Each member received five basic votes. Id. art. 12(2), 14 U.S.T. at
1919, 469 U.N.T.S. at 184. The remaining votes of exporting members were
divided in proportion to their respective basic export quotas. Id. art. 12(3), 14
U.S.T. at 1919, 469 U.N.T.S. at 184. The remaining votes of importing mem-
bers were divided in proportion to the average volume of their respective coffee
imports in the preceding three-year period. Id. art. 12(4), 14 U.S.T. at 1919,
469 U.N.T.S. at 184.
52. LUCIER, supra note 11, at 129-30.
53. PIETERSE & SiLvis, supra note 21, at 64-65.
54. FISHER, supra note 2, at 85-86.
55. LUCIER, supra note 11, at 129.
56. PIETERSE & SiLvis, supra note 21, at 64. Coffee exports to these non-
traditional markets became known as 'tourist coffee." Id. Exporters would also
ship coffee through nonmember exporting countries to traditional consuming
countries. LUCIER, supra note 11, at 129-30.
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African producing countries justified these methods of cir-
cumventing the agreement by arguing that the basic export quo-
tas unfairly limited their potential for export growth.5 7 In fact,
the ICO refused to increase their export quotas even when there
was a substantial decrease in the world coffee supply. In 1963,
for example, Brazil's exports were lower than expected,58 and
African producers requested that the ICO allow them to expand
their basic export quotas.59 The ICO refused this request.60
The rigidity of quotas remained a continuing controversy be-
tween small producing countries and the traditional coffee pro-
ducing giants.6 '
The use of export quotas under the 1962 Agreement suc-
ceeded in sustaining market prices above the targeted level.
However, the export quotas dramatically increased the amount
of coffee warehoused in producing countries. The warehoused
stocks rose from 6.5 million bags in the mid-1950s to their high-
est level of 83 million bags in 1966.62 The reduction of ware-
housed stocks was a main concern of both coffee producing
countries and consuming countries as they negotiated a renewal
of the agreement.
B. THE 1968 AGREEMENT
The 1968 Agreement6 3 retained the essential elements of
the 1962 Agreement, with additional measures providing for an
57. LUCIER, supra note 11, at 128, 134-35.
58. Id. at 131. The Brazilian state of Parana experienced both frosts and
fires in August and September 1963. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Any change in the annual export quotas required a two-thirds ma-
jority vote. ICA 1962, supra note 5, arts. 30, 32, 14 U.S.T. at 1926-27, 469
U.N.T.S. at 200, 202.
61. FISHER, supra note 2, at 95-103.
62. MWANDHA, supra note 3, at 114.
63. ICA 1968, supra note 7. Final approval of the 1968 Agreement was
delayed until 1970 due to a controversy regarding the discrimination by certain
producer nations in favor of soluble coffee. FISHER, supra note 2, at 133-46.
The controversy surrounded Brazil's financial incentives for the processing of
green coffee into a soluble powder from which instant coffee was made. Id. at
133. Brazil did not tax soluble coffee exports, which gave Brazilian soluble cof-
fee processors a cost advantage over U.S. soluble coffee processors. Id. at 134.
The NCA publicly condemned any importation of Brazilian soluble coffee. Id.
However, some American corporations purchased soluble coffee plants in Bra-
zil, thus acquiring a financial interest in importing soluble coffee back to the
United States. Id. at 143. The United States refused to approve the 1968
Agreement until a compromise was reached. Id. at 139. A provision was in-
cluded in the agreement prohibiting an exporting country from applying gov-
ernmental measures that led to discriminatory treatment in favor of soluble
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"indicator price"64 and a Diversification Fund.65 The indicator
price resolved the controversy between larger and smaller pro-
ducing nations over the rigidly maintained export quotas. 66 If
the world market price for coffee rose above a specified price ceil-
ing, export quotas would be increased. Conversely, if the world
market price fell below a specified floor, export quotas would be
decreased. Under the indicator price mechanism, if larger pro-
ducing countries experienced a severe decrease in production
and market prices rose, other producing countries were allowed
to increase exports.6 7
The Diversification Fund supported the development of al-
ternative crops and industries in coffee producing nations in an
effort to limit the global production of coffee and reduce ware-
housed stocks.68 Contributions to the Fund were required from
every major exporter.69 While Brazil and the United States
strongly supported the Fund, each did so for different reasons.
The Brazilian government recognized that high levels of coffee
coffee as compared to green coffee. ICA 1968, supra note 7, art. 44, 19 U.S.T. at
6369-72, 647 U.N.T.S. at 52-56. This controversy showed how the United
States fought hard to keep the processing of commodities in developed countries
and diverted away from developing countries. LUCIER, supra note 11, at 146-47.
64. ICA 1968, supra note 7, arts. 35-37, 19 U.S.T. at 6359-62, 647 U.N.T.S.
at 38-42.
65. Id. art. 54, 19 U.S.T. at 6379-81, 647 U.N.T.S. at 68-71.
66. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 122, 128. The 1962 Agreement did not
establish a target price range. Id. at 127. The International Coffee Council had
been given the responsibility to separately negotiate each and every price and
quota adjustment. ICA 1962, supra note 5, art. 34, 14 U.S.T. at 1927-28, 469
U.N.T.S. at 202. In March 1965, the ICO had decided upon market floor and
ceiling prices as cut-offs for an increase or decrease in basic export quotas.
FISHER, supra note 2, at 95. This indicator price had to remain above or below
the cut-off market prices for 15 consecutive days before the adjustment of any
export quotas. LUCIER, supra note 11, at 133 n.29.
67. ICA 1968, supra note 7, art. 34, 19 U.S.T. at 6359, 647 U.N.T.S. at 38.
68. Id. art. 54, 19 U.S.T. at 6379-81, 647 U.N.T.S. at 68-71. The Diversifi-
cation Fund was established "to further the objectives of limiting the production
of coffee in order to bring supply into reasonable balance with world demand."
Id. art. 54(1), 19 U.S.T. at 6379, 647 U.N.T.S. at 68. "The contribution of each
exporting Participant shall be utilized for programmes or projects approved by
the Fund carried out inside its territory, but in any case twenty percent of the
contribution shall be payable in freely convertible currency for use in any
programmes or projects approved by the Fund." Id. art. 54(4), 19 U.S.T. at
6380, 647 U.N.T.S. at 70.
69. Id. art. 54(2), 19 U.S.T. at 6379, 647 U.N.T.S. at 68. Participation in
the Fund was compulsory for each member that was not an importing member,
and that had an export entitlement over 100,000 bags. Id. A participant was
obligated to contribute, in quarterly installments, the equivalent of $0.60 multi-
plied by the number of bags it actually exported in excess of 100,000 bags. Id.
art. 54(3), 19 U.S.T. at 6380, 647 U.N.T.S. at 68.
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production would eventually translate into lower market
prices. 70 The U.S. government, concerned about the economic
stability of coffee producing countries, sought to decrease these
countries' economic dependence on coffee exports. 71
In 1971, cooperation among producing nations ended as a
result of the devaluation of the U.S. dollar.7 2 The devaluation
caused a reduction in the real earnings of producing countries
from coffee export sales. To compensate for lost earnings, most
producing countries sought to increase their coffee exports. As a
result of dissension over this issue, producing countries were un-
able to reach any agreement on quota levels for the 1972-73 sea-
son.73 In December 1972, the 1968 Agreement's economic
provisions were not renewed. 74
From 1972 to 1975, market prices remained stable without
a functioning international coffee agreement. In July 1975, the
stability was interrupted when Brazil experienced a severe
frost.7 5 From 1975 to 1977, U.S. coffee prices rose more than
five hundred percent.76 The increase in market prices stung
U.S. consumers and caused U.S. importers to suffer from drasti-
cally reduced domestic sales. 77
C. THE 1976 AGREEMENT
The 1976 Agreement,7 through which the U.S. government
actively sought to protect U.S. consumers and importers, at-
tempted to stimulate world coffee production.7 9 First, export
70. See LUCIER, supra note 11, at 138. Between 1962 and 1967, the Brazil-
ian government paid growers to destroy an estimated 1.7 billion out of a total
4.1 billion coffee trees, id. at 136, reducing world production by more than 5%,
id. at 138.
71. PIETERSE & SILvIs, supra note 21, at 66.
72. LuCIER, supra note 11, at 148.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 149.
75. Id. at 43; see supra note 25.
76. New York spot prices of Brazilian Arabica coffee rose from $0.68 per
pound in July 1975 to $3.69 per pound in April 1977. TRoPicAL PRODUCTS,
supra note 5, at 23.
77. For years Brazil and other major producers violated the 1968 Agree-
ment by not exporting their allotted quotas in full. PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra
note 21, at 67. U.S. importers resented this constant undershipping, especially
after the 1975 frost. Id. During negotiations toward the 1976 Agreement, U.S.
negotiators sought to introduce incentives to put any accumulated stocks on the
market even when market prices were firm. Rising Coffee Prices, supra note 25,
at 169-70.
78. ICA 1976, supra note 8.
79. For an analysis of the 1976 Agreement, see Rising Coffee Prices, supra
note 25, at 169-80.
[Vol. 4:79
ITERNrATIONAL COFFEE A GREEMENTS
quotas were separated into two parts: two-thirds fixed and one-
third variable.8 0 The variable quota was determined by the
amount of coffee each country produced. The more coffee a cer-
tain country produced in proportion to other countries, the
larger that country's export quota."' Smaller producer countries
thus had an incentive to increase production. Second, the ICO
monitored producer shortfalls and increased other exporting
members' quotas by the amount of the shortfall.8 2 Third, the
Diversification Fund was eliminated.8 3
The composite indicator price continued to control the ad-
justment of quotas.8 4 Until 1980, however, high market prices
remained above the level at which quotas became operative.
The agreement's target price level was between $1.20 and $1.40
per pound.8 5
D. THE 1983 AGREEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
The 1983 Agreement8 6 included essentially the same provi-
sions as the 1976 Agreement.87 Two developments, however,
80. ICA 1976, supra note 8, art. 35(1), 28 U.S.T. at 6435-36, 1024 U.N.T.S.
at 22. The fixed part corresponded to at least 70% of the global annual quota,
and the variable part corresponded to as much as 30% of the global annual
quota. Id.
81. Id. art. 35, 28 U.S.T. at 6435-36, 1024 U.N.T.S. at 22. The 1976 Agree-
ment states that the variable part of the basic export quota "shall be distributed
among exporting Members in the proportion which the verified stocks of each
exporting Member bear to the total verified stocks of all exporting Members
having basic quotas." Id. art. 35(2), 28 U.S.T. at 6436, 1024 U.N.T.S. at 22.
U.S. officials predicted a redistribution of market shares to African and Central
American countries, thus potentially lowering Brazil's market share from 38%
to 31%. Rising Coffee Prices, supra note 25, at 177. The fixed and variable
quota system ensured that overproduction would remain a feature of the world
coffee market. The stockholdings in producer countries effectively eliminated
any risk of market undersupply caused by a frost or drought. See STEWART,
supra note 28, at 250.
82. ICA 1976, supra note 8, art. 40(1), 28 U.S.T. at 6439, 1024 U.N.T.S. at
23-24.
83. Countries were no longer required to submit production plans to the
ICO as required under the 1968 Agreement. Compare ICA 1968, supra note 7,
art. 48, 19 U.S.T. at 6375-77, 647 U.N.T.S. at 62-64 with ICA 1976, supra note
8, art. 50, 28 U.S.T. at 6450, 1024 U.N.T.S. at 29.
84. ICA 1976, supra note 8, art. 33, 28 U.S.T. at 6432-35, 1024 U.N.T.S. at
20. The composite indicator price was the average of the indicator prices for
Other Milds and Robusta coffees. Id. art. 33(1)(b)(i), 28 U.S.T. at 6432, 1024
U.N.T.S. at 20.
85. PIETERSE & SiLvis, supra note 21, at 84. Quota adjustments were
planned at $1.15, $1.20, $1.40, $1.45 and $1.50. Id.
86. ICA 1983, supra note 9.
87. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
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eventually led to a breakdown of cooperation between producing
and consuming countries and an end to the 1983 Agreement in
1989.88 First, the variable quota's incentive to produce resulted
in continued accumulation of surplus stocks. This surplus coffee
sold at highly discounted prices in nonmember markets and ef-
fectively established a two-tier pricing system. 89 Again, the
price differentiation between countries facilitated the use of non-
member markets as conduits to the member consumer markets.
Although the agreement provided penalties for cheating,90 the
ICO failed to impose them.91
Second, changing trends in consumer demand led importers
to reject the quota structure under the agreement. In the 1980s,
U.S. consumers increasingly differentiated between traditional
beans and gourmet beans, and demand for gourmet beans rose
dramatically.92 Inherent in the established quota structure of
the agreements, however, was a rigidity in the relative supply
between different types of coffee beans. One cause of the rigidity
between different beans was that quotas were set on a country
by country basis.93 Because climate and geography determine
the type of bean produced by each country, fixed export shares
between countries resulted in rigid relative supplies of different
types of beans. Another cause of the rigidity in the relative sup-
ply was that the indicator price included only certain types of
coffee beans, specifically the less expensive Robusta beans.94
88. For a summary of market problems under the 1983 Agreement, see
ED&F MAN COFFEE LTD., THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT: THE LAST
CHANCE! 11 (1991).
89. STEWART, supra note 28, at 261.
90. See ICA 1983, supra note 9, art. 42, T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, at 45-46, 1333
U.N.T.S. at 138. For example, if an exporting member exceeded its quota, a
quantity equal to 110% of that excess would be deducted from one or more sub-
sequent quotas. Id. art. 42(3), T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, at 45, 1333 U.N.T.S. at 138.
A second violation carried the same penalty. Id. art. 42(4), T.I.A.S. No. 11,095,
at 45, 1333 U.N.T.S. at 138. A third violation carried the additional penalties of
a suspension of voting rights and possible exclusion from the agreement. Id.
art. 42(5), T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, at 45, 1333 U.N.T.S. at 138.
91. ED&F MAN COFFEE LTD., supra note 88, at 11, 16.
92. Mark Robichaux, Boom in Fancy Coffee Pits Big Marketers, Little
Firms, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1989, at B1. Retail sales of gourmet coffee rose from
$210 million in 1983 to an estimated $675 million in 1989. Id. Gourmet coffee
sales account for more than 10% of all coffee sales. Id. Gourmet coffee is the
only segment, aside from decaffeinated coffee, that continues to grow in the
overall declining coffee market. Id.
93. See supra text accompanying note 47.
94. The composite indicator price included only specific coffees from the
Other Milds and Robusta coffees. PIETERSE & SILvis, supra note 21, at 50. The
1983 Agreement allowed for the establishment of price ranges and price differ-
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Therefore, an increase in the demand for and price of gourmet
coffee beans, without a corresponding rise in the demand for and
price of Robusta beans, did not result in an increase in the sup-
ply of gourmet beans. 95 U.S. importers thus claimed that they
were unable to increase their imports of gourmet beans to meet
increased consumer demand. 96
The U.S. government recognized both of these problems and
advocated changes in the agreement. 97 Although the U.S. gov-
ernment was somewhat flexible in negotiating a new agree-
ment,98 U.S. importers demanded that any new agreement
comprehensively address the two-tier pricing system and the in-
flexible patterns of supply.99 Without the assurance of an ac-
ceptable agreement, U.S. importers advocated free market trade
as purportedly in the consumer's best interests. 100
In 1989, the agreement's economic provisions expired. Bra-
zil, Colombia and Mexico flooded the market with large quanti-
ties of coffee and prices tumbled.1 1 From 1989 through 1993,
entials for the principal groups of coffee and a composite price range. ICA 1983,
supra note 9, art. 38(2), T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, at 43, 1333 U.N.T.S. at 137. How-
ever, countries agreed upon the same composite indicator price as under the
1976 Agreement. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Thus, the compos-
ite indicator price did not include market prices for Brazilian Arabicas and Co-
lombian Milds. PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra note 21, at 50. Price quotations for
Brazilian and Colombian coffees were administered by the coffee authorities in
those countries. Id. Importing countries felt that these price quotations would
have a large influence on the composite indicator price, thus enabling the Bra-
zilian and Colombian coffee authorities to manipulate the agreement. Id.
95. ED&F MAN COFFEE LTD., supra note 88, at 11, 14.
96. The 1983 Agreement allowed for quota adjustments in response to mar-
ket price fluctuations of the principal types of coffee. ICA 1983, supra note 9,
art. 39(3), T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, at 43-44, 1333 U.N.T.S. at 137. Otherwise, quo-
tas were fixed for a period of four quarters. Id. art. 33(6), T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, at
38, 1333 U.N.T.S. at 135.
97. ALLEN WALLIS, COMMODITY MARKETS AND COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 4
(Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Current Policy No. 791, 1986) (In
order "[t]o stabilize prices effectively, the agreement must allocate quotas ac-
cording to an exporter's available supply").
98. While supporting international trade through free markets, the U.S.
government continued to pursue a new coffee commodity agreement. BUREAU
OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, GIST, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY
AGREEMENTS (Apr. 1986).
99. See NATIONAL COFFEE ASS'N OF U.S.A., RESOLUTION OF BOARD OF Di-
RECTORS (Feb. 8, 1988); NATIONAL COFFEE ASS'N OF U.S.A., FOR IMMEDIATE RE-
LEASE (Feb. 6, 1989).
100. See NATIONAL COFFEE ASS'N OF U.S.A., RESOLUTION OF BOARD OF Di-
RECTORS (Feb. 8, 1988).
101. VOGT, supra note 4, at 1. From June to July 1989, the New York spot
prices of Brazilian Arabica coffee fell from $1.15 per pound to $0.78 per pound.
TROPICAL PRODUCTS, supra note 5, at 23.
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prices remained at relatively low levels, averaging around sev-
enty cents per pound. 10 2 During informal meetings with other
ICO members, U.S. officials insisted that any future agreement
use a universal quota system.' 0 3 The universal quota system
would restrict exports to nonmember nations, as well as member
nations, thus eliminating uneven prices between member and
nonmember countries. The universal quota system would also
establish a separate indicator price mechanism for each type of
bean. 10 4 Members of the U.S. coffee industry continued to sup-
port a free market, 05 with strong support from some congres-
sional members.106
In September 1993, the United States announced its with-
drawal from the ICO.107 A released statement read, "[g]iven our
decades of commitment to international co-operation in coffee,
we do not take this step lightly. We simply do not have the sup-
port at home to remain in the International Coffee Agree-
ment." 08 Some coffee producing countries strongly criticized
the U.S. withdrawal.' 0 9 The United States defended its with-
drawal by stating a preference for free market conditions. 10
102. This average is for New York spot prices of Brazilian Arabica coffee,
from July 1989 through June 1993. TROPicAL PRODUCTS, supra note 5, at 23.
103. VOGT, supra note 4, at 13.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 11.
106. Senator Hank Brown (R-Colo.) filed an amendment to the Commerce
State Adjustment measure to prevent the United States from contributing
funds to the ICO. Behrmann, supra note 15, at C12.
107. U.S. Leaving World Coffee Organization, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept.
28, 1993, at C3. The U.S. withdrawal was effective October 1, 1993. Id.
108. U.S. Announces Withdrawal from ICO, Agence Fr. Presse, Financial,
Sept. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. U.S. monetary
contributions significantly helped defray the ICO's administrative costs. Coffee
Countries Discuss Grounds for Budget Changes, Agence Fr. Presse, Financial,
Sept. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. The United
States contributed about 19% ($790,000) of the ICO's total budget. Id.
109. One Brazilian official expressed that "[alt a time when producers most
needed the cooperation of consumers, the U.S. decided to withdraw. This sig-
nals a certain indifference on the part of the new U.S. administration." Caro-
line Bulloch, U.S. Quits Coffee Forum as Support for Commodity Pacts Fades,
Reuter Eur. Bus. Rep., BC Cycle, Sept. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Curnws File.
110. "From July 1989 to the present a free market has ensued. Many people
in our private sector who had operated for almost a decade under the structure
of an international agreement developed a preference for this new environ-
ment," said a U.S. delegate at the ICO conference. Id.
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III. THE 1993 COFFEE RETENTION PLAN
In September 1993, coffee producing countries abandoned
hopes of renewing a commodity agreement with the support of
consuming nations, and instead formed a producer cartel called
the Association of Coffee Producing Countries (the "Associa-
tion"). On October 1, 1993, the Association implemented its Cof-
fee Retention Plan (the "1993 Plan").11'
A. PROVISIONS OF THE 1993 PLAN
1. Retention of Coffee Stocks
The 1993 Plan uses a technique different from that under
previous agreements to determine the amount that a producing
nation can export. Previous agreements first determined total
world coffee exports and then divided this amount between all
producing countries. The 1993 Plan does not explicitly deter-
mine a level of world coffee exports. Instead, the 1993 Plan at-
tempts to lower world exports by requiring each producing
country to retain and store a certain percentage of exports. 112
The 1993 Plan uses an indicator price to determine the level of
future retention or release of stored stocks as prices fluctuate.
The 1993 Plan also provides for different retention levels for the
two main types of coffee beans, Arabica and Robusta. 113
The 1993 Plan began by setting retention levels for Arabica
beans, and similar retention levels for Robusta beans were later
established. 114 Different retention levels were set for each of
two consecutive phases, a preliminary stabilization phase and a
long-term stabilization phase. In the preliminary phase, when
the indicator price is below seventy-five cents per pound, the re-
tention level is twenty percent of coffee exports. 115 When the
indicator price is between seventy-five and eighty cents, the re-
111. 1993 PLAN, supra note 13, art. 6.
112. Id. arts. 8-14. The 1993 Plan allows quota exemptions only for coun-
tries having annual exports less than 400,000 bags, based on average exports
for the period 1989-1992. Id. art. 42. The 1993 Plan does not include quota
exemptions for new markets.
113. Id. art. 16.
114. Retention levels and the establishment of a composite indicator price
for Robusta beans began on January 19, 1994. TRoPIcAL PRODUCTS, supra note
5, at 26. For Robusta coffee, a 20% retention is required if the indicator price is
below $.60 per pound. Id. at 25. For prices between $.65 and $.80, no retention
is required. Id. A controlled release of stocks takes place when the market
price remains above $.70 per pound. Id.
115. 1993 PLAN, supra note 13, art. 9.
1995]
MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
tention level is ten percent. 116 When the indicator price is be-
tween eighty and eighty-five cents, coffee retention is
suspended. 117 When the indicator price is above eighty-five
cents, members release previously retained stocks.
118
Once all retained stocks are released for the first time, the
long-term phase begins to operate and a new set of retention
levels is applied. When the indicator price is below eighty cents
the retention level is twenty percent. 119 When the indicator
price is between eighty and eighty-five cents, the retention level
is ten percent. 120 When the indicator price is between eighty-
five and ninety cents, retention is suspended. 12 1 When the indi-
cator price is above ninety cents, members release previously re-
tained stocks and retention levels are suspended.
122
2. Storage of Retained Stocks
The 1993 Plan requires storage of retained stocks in ap-
proved warehouses 12 3 and in areas clearly marked and separate
from other goods. 124 Although substantial amounts of storage
space were built under the 1976 Agreement,' 2 5 purchasing and
storing excess production remains very costly. 12 6 To fulfill its
own retention obligations, for example, the Brazilian govern-
ment privatized the retention program and forced domestic ex-
116. Id.
117. Id. art. 11.
118. Id. art. 13.
119. Id. art. 14.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 14, para. 1.
123. Id. art. 15.
124. Id. art. 15, para. 1. Upon delivery to the warehouse, a Deposit Certifi-
cate is issued. Id. art. 15, para. 2. The Deposit Certificate confirms the reten-
tion deposit, identifies the beans and indicates that the beans are of export
quality. Id. The retained coffee cannot be transported or replaced. Id. art. 15,
para. 5. Coffee can be stored for several years without serious deterioration.
V.D. WICKIZER, COFFEE TEA AND COCOA 57 (1951). When storing coffee, avoid-
ing humidity is more important than maintaining a certain temperature. Id.
Thus, storage in the country of production is usually more difficult than in tem-
perate-zone consuming markets. Id.
125. DE GRAAIF, supra note 1, at 57. In the 1970s, Brazil had the capability
to store 60 million bags of coffee. Id.
126. For example, Brazil's 1993 estimated cost for storing 20% of exports
was $60-80 million. Coffee Producing Countries Join Forces to Try to Boost
World Prices, Agence Fr. Presse, Financial, Sept. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Curnws File. The Brazilian government proposed a two dollar
levy on each 60 kilogram (132 pound) bag of coffee beans to help finance the
Association. Brazil Proposes Coffee Levy to Finance New Organization, Agence
Fr. Presse, Dec. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
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porters to bear the costs of buying and storing any retained
coffee. 127
3. Enforcement and Sanctions
The 1993 Plan utilizes several different verification tech-
niques. First, a valid Certificate of Origin is required in order
for coffee to be exported.128 To obtain a Certificate of Origin,
each private exporter must turn over a deposit certificate indi-
cating the amount of coffee deposited for storage. 129 Second,
each member government must inspect the storage ware-
houses 130 and send a copy of the inspection or verification report
to the Retention Management Committee. 13' This Committee
periodically verifies the member country's own inspections by or-
dering internationally recognized auditors to verify the reten-
tion reports.' 32 Third, the Committee relies upon the ICO's
published export statistics as a final verification.' 33 Each mem-
ber must pay for expenses incurred in the administration and
control of the 1993 Plan, including expenses incurred in the au-
ditors' retention verification.13 4
The 1993 Plan severely punishes any cheating. 135 For the
first violation, when a retention deficit is established by audit,
the violating country must add to storage stocks twice the
amount of the deficit. 136 The second violation requires an addi-
tion to storage of three times the deficit. 137 A third violation car-
ries the additional penalty of having the country's voting rights
at the Retention Management Committee suspended.' 38 After
the third violation, the Committee can exclude the infringing
country from the 1993 Plan.139
127. Patrick McCurry, Brazil Gets to Grips with Coffee Scheme, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 1994, at 32. Exporters will not be allowed to ship coffee without proof
that they have stored 20% of the shipment volume. Id.
128. 1993 PLAN, supra note 13, art. 22.
129. Id. art. 22, para. 1.
130. Id. art. 17.
131. Id. art. 18.
132. Id. art. 19.
133. Id. art. 24.
134. Id. art. 40.
135. Id. arts. 27-32.
136. Id. art. 27.
137. Id. art. 28.
138. Id. art. 29.
139. Id. art. 29, para. 1.
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4. Member Voting Rights
Members exercise their voting rights through representa-
tives appointed to the Retention Management Committee. 140
Although the Committee usually acts by consensus, a two-thirds
majority vote is sufficient.141 Each member's number of votes is
proportional to its exports, 142 so the voting power remains with
the larger exporting countries. As in previous agreements, Bra-
zil and Colombia hold the most votes.143
B. RESULTS
The 1993 Plan had an immediate effect on coffee market
prices. Beginning in October 1993, the market price steadily in-
creased, as did the Plan's indicator price. 144 By May 1994, the
indicator price rose above ninety cents per pound, and members
suspended the retention of coffee exports.' 45 The 1993 Plan
therefore succeeded in its main goals of increasing market prices
and reducing consuming countries' warehoused stocks.
However, a frost insured that the market price would re-
main above the Plan's target level of ninety cents per pound. On
June 26-27, 1994, and July 9-10, 1994, temperatures fell near or
below freezing across large parts of the coffee-producing areas of
Brazil. 146 Brazil's 1995-1996 coffee production was reduced by
an estimated thirty to forty percent.' 47 Because Brazil accounts
for one-fourth of global coffee exports,' 48 market prices in-
140. Id. art. 33, para. 1.
141. Id. art. 38.
142. Id. art. 38, para. 1.
143. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
144. TROPmCAL PRODUCTS, supra note 5, at 23, 26-27.
145. On May 17, 1994, the 20-day moving average of the ICO's composite
indicator price rose to $.91 per pound. Id. at 26. See also Alison Maitland, Cof-
fee Stock Sales Agreed as Surge Continues, FIN. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at 34
(noting that producers agreed to release the remaining 50% of stocks retained);
Coffee at Its Highest Price Since the End of Quotas in '89, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
1994, at 48 (noting that producers had reached their price goal).
146. TROPICAL PRODUCTS, supra note 5, at 11.
147. Id. The U.S. Department of Agriculture conducted a 21-day, 3800-mile
field survey to gauge the damage of the two frosts. Id. Virtually all of the 260
million coffee trees located in the Brazilian state of Parand were damaged. Id.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that 1995-1996 coffee produc-
tion in Parand would be reduced from 2.0 million bags to 0.2 million bags. Id.;
see also Howard Simon, Freeze in Brazil Drains Stocks in U.S., J. COM., Aug. 11,
1994, at Al, A8 (noting that Brazil's own damage estimate for the 1995-1996
crop was 40%).
148. For the 1993-1994 season, Brazil's coffee exports were estimated at
18.5 million bags, and global coffee exports were estimated at 74.5 million bags.
WORLD COFFEE SITUATION, supra note 12, at 5.
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creased to well over three times the price level previous to the
Plan's implementation. 149 Coffee growers immediately began to
plant new trees and improve their production methods. 150
Through December 1994, coffee prices remained above the tar-
get price of ninety cents, thus precluding the retention of coffee
exports.
IV. EVALUATION OF PAST COFFEE AGREEMENTS
AND THE 1993 PLAN
To evaluate the current and past coffee agreements, one
must consider the gains and losses to all parties. The gains to
producers, consumers and importers from coffee price stabiliza-
tion must be considered along with the benefits to producers and
the burden to consumers of potentially artificially high prices.
Furthermore, one must consider alternative mechanisms to
more efficiently achieve results similar to those attained by the
1993 Plan.
A. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE AGREEMENTS
One almost certain effect of each coffee agreement is the sta-
bilization of coffee prices. Export quotas or retention provisions
act to stabilize coffee market prices by tempering supply fluctua-
tions. 1' 1 Price stabilization benefits individual producers and
producer countries, both of whom are particularly vulnerable to
coffee price instability. From the individual growers' perspec-
tive, coffee is often the sole crop produced and thus growers are
not protected through crop diversification against coffee price
fluctuations. From the perspective of coffee producing countries,
coffee is often an important source of export revenues.1 52 A de-
crease in coffee prices can have a devastating effect on these
economies.' 53 Although the 1968 Agreement attempted to alle-
149. In July 1994, New York spot prices of Brazilian Arabica Coffee aver-
aged $2.11 per pound, as compared to $0.65 per pound in July 1993. TRoPicAL
PRODUCTS, supra note 5, at 23. However, in December 1994, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture estimated that rising output in other parts of the world
would offset some of Brazil's shortfall. Suzanne McGee, Coffee Prices Plunge to
Lowest Levels Since June, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1994, at C14.
150. Id. at 3.
151. The 1993 Plan stabilized market prices through the use of a retention
plan. See supra part III.A.1. Previous agreements, such as the 1962 Agree-
ment, stabilized market prices through the use of export quotas. See supra part
II.A.
152. See supra note 4.
153. For example, in Brazil, an estimated two million coffee workers lost
their jobs following the collapse of the 1983 Agreement. Brooke, supra note 15,
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viate this vulnerability by providing funds to diversify these
economies, subsequent agreements, including the 1993 Plan,
conspicuously lack any diversification programs.154
Within consuming countries, the benefits of price stabiliza-
tion are less clear. On the one hand, coffee importers are vulner-
able to price instability to the extent that they focus primarily
on coffee and cannot maintain profit margins as prices vary. On
the other hand, consumers are less vulnerable to coffee price
fluctuations. Coffee purchases form a small percentage of
spending for most consumers. Fluctuating coffee prices thus do
not translate into substantial fluctuations in a consumer's ag-
gregate spending.
A more questionable potential effect of international coffee
agreements is the artificial inflation of coffee prices. The ques-
tion remains open whether the target prices under any of the
agreements, including the 1993 Plan, were set above the long-
run equilibrium price that would exist under free market condi-
tions. Given that none of the agreements explicitly stated an
objective to raise prices above free market levels, the agree-
ments can be read to merely intend the stabilization of prices at
free market levels. However, some argue that the agreements
set the target price at an artificially high level. Producer-only
agreements, such as the 1993 Plan, especially give rise to suspi-
cion. 155 Producers can rationally be expected to artificially in-
flate coffee prices to maximize monopoly profits. Furthermore,
even though pre-1993 agreements included coffee consuming
countries as parties, their interests may not have been adverse
to the interests of producing countries. As previously noted, con-
suming countries pursued earlier agreements in large part for
the economic benefit of producing countries. 156 Pre-1993 agree-
ments, therefore, may have also artificially inflated coffee prices
for the benefit of producing nations. 157
at 11. Brazil lost an estimated $2.5 billion due to the low market prices from
1989 to 1993. Id.
154. For a discussion of the 1968 Agreement's Diversification Fund, see
supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
155. The Association's 1993 Plan has been characterized as the work of a
coffee cartel, see, e.g., Neil Behrmann, Coffee Futures Are Drifting as Traders
Seek Better Indication of How New Cartel Will Fare, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1993,
at C14, similar to the OPEC oil cartel.
156. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
157. If pre-1993 agreements supported prices that were above the long-run
equilibrium level, the agreements levied a hidden tax on consumers and subsi-
dized production in exporting countries. ALLEN WALLIS, NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD
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Whether any coffee agreement should be viewed as artifi-
cially inflating coffee prices may depend on whether, in the long
run, coffee producing nations continue to accumulate stocks.
Over the long term, the only way to effectively maintain a target
price above the free market level is to artificially reduce long-
term aggregate coffee exports through a persistent storage of
coffee stocks or a decrease in overall production.
B. REFLECTIONS ON THE 1993 RETENTION PLAN
To the extent that the agreements are purely price stabiliza-
tion measures, the 1993 Plan seems to offer the most promising
stabilization mechanism. The use of a retention plan based on
export volume, rather than historical market share, creates
greater flexibility by adjusting export quotas to current market
production shares. The 1993 Plan's adjustment to current mar-
ket shares leads to less dissatisfaction with allocated export
shares, and thereby eliminates the primary source of producer
dissatisfaction underlying the failure of past agreements. 158
To the extent that the 1993 Plan intends to artificially in-
flate prices, long-run price inflation can only result from perma-
nently storing coffee stocks. There may be, however, more
efficient ways to limit coffee exports than the 1993 Plan's perma-
nent storage of coffee stocks. Options include the burning of ex-
cess coffee, leaving fields fallow, crop diversification programs
and international economic aid from consuming nations to pro-
ducing nations. In the past, all of these options have been used
to limit the market supply of coffee, but each is conspicuously
lacking in the 1993 Plan. Without such measures, coffee produ-
cers are forced to continually rely on a retention plan or risk the
failure of another coffee agreement. The 1993 Plan's strong
oversight and enforcement provisions, however, may provide the
unity necessary for long-term success.
V. CONCLUSION
The world coffee market historically suffers from price in-
stability. Four consumer-producer agreements attempted to
stabilize prices through export quotas, but all failed to reach a
long-term solution. The 1993 Coffee Retention Plan is the latest
effort in this direction. By forcing producers to retain certain
A NEw INTERNAITONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT 2 (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State, Current Policy No. 1139, 1988).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
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percentages of coffee earmarked for export, coffee producing na-
tions succeeded in raising the market price to target levels.
Continued reliance upon export quotas or export retention plans
to stabilize market prices, however, has been unsuccessful in the
past. At present, it is too early to determine whether the im-
provements upon previous International Coffee Agreements in
the 1993 Plan will finally achieve the elusive goal of long-term
price stability.
